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Abstract
Background: Infections with carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) are increasingly being reported from
patients in healthcare settings. They are associated with high patient morbidity, attributable mortality and hospital
costs. Patients who are “at-risk” may be carriers of these multidrug-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (MDR-E).
The purpose of this guidance is to raise awareness and identify the “at-risk” patient when admitted to a healthcare
setting and to outline effective infection prevention and control measures to halt the entry and spread of CRE.
Methods: The guidance was created by a group of experts who were functioning independently of their
organisations, during two meetings hosted by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. A list of
epidemiological risk factors placing patients “at-risk” for carriage with CRE was created by the experts. The
conclusions of a systematic review on the prevention of spread of CRE, with the addition of expert opinion, were
used to construct lists of core and supplemental infection prevention and control measures to be implemented for
“at-risk” patients upon admission to healthcare settings.
Results: Individuals with the following profile are “at-risk” for carriage of CRE: a) a history of an overnight stay in a
healthcare setting in the last 12 months, b) dialysis-dependent or cancer chemotherapy in the last 12 months, c)
known previous carriage of CRE in the last 12 months and d) epidemiological linkage to a known carrier of a CRE.
Core infection prevention and control measures that should be considered for all patients in healthcare settings
were compiled. Preliminary supplemental measures to be implemented for “at-risk” patients on admission are: pre-
emptive isolation, active screening for CRE, and contact precautions. Patients who are confirmed positive for CRE
will need additional supplemental measures.
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Conclusions: Strengthening the microbiological capacity, surveillance and reporting of new cases of CRE in
healthcare settings and countries is necessary to monitor the epidemiological situation so that, if necessary, the
implemented CRE prevention strategies can be refined in a timely manner. Creating a large communication
network to exchange this information would be helpful to understand the extent of the CRE reservoir and to
prevent infections in healthcare settings, by applying the principles outlined here.
This guidance document offers suggestions for best practices, but is in no way prescriptive for all healthcare
settings and all countries. Successful implementation will result if there is local commitment and accountability. The
options for intervention can be adopted or adapted to local needs, depending on the availability of financial and
structural resources.
Keywords: Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae, CRE, Multidrug-resistant Enterobacteriaceae, MDR-E,
Antimicrobial resistance, AMR, Healthcare-associated infections, Active screening, Core measures, Supplemental
measures
Introduction
Infections with carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae
(CRE), and confirmed carbapenemase-producing Entero-
bacteriaceae (CPE) are increasingly being reported from
patients in healthcare settings and the community [1–3].
While community and healthcare infections can be
caused by CRE and CPE, the epidemiology differs
amongst bacterial species, each having a tropism for har-
bouring certain resistance mechanisms [4].
Infections with CRE and CPE are more difficult to
treat, because few, and in some cases no, antimicrobials
remain effective against them, due to their extensive re-
sistance patterns. Furthermore, they are associated with
high patient morbidity, attributable mortality, and hos-
pital costs [5]. Since Enterobacteriaceae are ubiquitous
in nature and human gastrointestinal tracts, CRE and
CPE are by now dispersed throughout the ecosystem,
resulting in community and healthcare infections [6].
Terms, definitions and tables used in this guidance
 For the purposes of harmonisation with other
guidance documents and reports in the literature,
carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) and
carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE),
are both referred to as CRE in this document.
Where necessary to specify that carbapenem resist-
ance is due to a carbapenemase, however, the term
CPE is used.
 The measures suggested in this guidance document
are not limited to CRE, but may also be applicable
to any species of multidrug-resistant Enterobacteria-
ceae (MDR-E). The decision whether to apply to
other MDR-E will be left to local decision-makers
and experts.
 The terms “rectal” and “faecal” “carriage” are used in
the literature interchangeably with the term
“colonisation”. In this guidance document, the term
“carriage” is used as an umbrella term to include
both “colonisation” and “clinical infection”.
 The term “healthcare facilities” refers to any type of
acute and long-term care facilities.
 The term “long-term care facility” (LTCF) refers to
any of the heterogeneous types of facilities which
“provide delivery of a broad range of services and
assistance to people who are limited in their ability
to function independently on a daily basis, i.e. to
autonomously perform the basic activities of daily
living, over an extended period of time. Long-term
care comprises a mix of both health and social com-
ponents, therefore pertaining to both health and so-
cial sectors” [7]. These can include “nursing homes,
skilled nursing facilities, assisted living, rehabilitation
facilities, residential homes, long-term psychiatric fa-
cilities” [8]. Countries can define their facilities as
LTCFs, by applying and interpreting the general def-
inition provided here.
 Contact precautions include: patient placement,
gowns/aprons, gloves, patient transport, disposable
noncritical patient-care equipment/patient-dedi-
cated use of such equipment and environmental
measures [9].
 In this guidance document, the maximum duration
of carriage for “at-risk” patients post discharge is
considered to be 12 months. In situations when
more than 12 months have elapsed, the admitting
healthcare worker (HCW), in consultation with the
infection prevention and control (IPC) team, shall
decide whether to consider a patient “at-risk”.
 Active screening of “at-risk” patients on admission
to a healthcare setting, encompasses rectal
screening, as well as screening from any other site
which is either actively infected, e.g. draining
wounds, or considered to be colonised.
 This guidance document includes six tables
(Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6) and a flowchart (Fig. 1).
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Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 contain answers to the three
main questions posed in this guidance document.
The flowchart is a tool to assist frontline workers
and IPC teams in their evaluation and decision-
making when admitting patients to healthcare
settings.
 This guidance document includes printable tables,
which can be found in (Additional file 1). These
include Table 1, and summaries of Tables 3, 4, 5,
and 6 from the main text, as well as a printable
version of the flowchart with instructions for use.
Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae
Carbapenemases are β-lactamases that hydrolyse carba-
penems, usually along with other β-lactams [10]. The
most frequently occurring species of Enterobacteriaceae
which are found to be carbapenem-resistant and that
produce carbapenemases, are Klebsiella pneumoniae (K.
pneumoniae) and Escherichia coli (E. coli) [2].
Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae display various
resistance profiles, depending on the type of genetic ele-
ments they harbour and the type of carbapenemases
they produce [11]. Since the first report of a carbapene-
mase in a K. pneumoniae isolate harbouring a Klebsiella
pneumoniae carbapenemase (KPC) in 1996, CPE have
now spread globally [12].
In Europe, data on carbapenem resistance in Entero-
bacteriaceae are available from various large surveillance
networks and projects. Carbapenem resistance in inva-
sive K. pneumoniae isolates is collected annually by
EARS-Net, and is reported as such, without further de-
scription of whether carbapenemases are present [3].
While carbapenem resistance in the EU/EEA remained
low in 2015 [3], the population-weighted mean demon-
strated a significantly increasing trend from 6.0% in
2012, to 8.1% in 2015 [3]. Similar increases have been
shown in other reports [13].
In 2013, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and
Control (ECDC) launched the “European survey of
carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (EuSCAPE)”,
using a self-assessment tool. The purpose was to describe
the European epidemiology of CPE, as well as to increase
awareness of and build laboratory capacity for the diagnosis
and surveillance of CPE in Europe [14]. The survey was re-
peated in 2015, with the findings demonstrating that CPE is
more widespread than previously thought and is expanding
[1]. In 2015, 13 of 38 countries reported either CPE inter-
regional spread or endemicity, which was an increase from
six countries in 2013. While the repeat survey findings in
2015 demonstrated an increased awareness of the spread of
CPE, along with improved microbiological capacity for
diagnosis, only 25 (66%) of 38 participating countries had
created a functional warning system, with mandatory notifi-
cation of CPE cases to health authorities [1].
Recent data from the EuSCAPE project provided the
first comparable and quality-controlled data on the occur-
rence of the most important carbapenemases in carba-
penem non-susceptible K. pneumoniae and E. coli clinical
isolates from sentinel hospitals in 34 European countries,
Turkey and Israel [2]. The results showed the presence of
all types of carbapenemases in the collected specimens
and a wide variation in geographical distribution of all
types of carbapenemases across the countries. Carbapene-
mases were present in 71% and 40% of the K. pneumoniae
and E. coli non-susceptible isolates, respectively, and the
ratio of carbapenemases present in K. pneumoniae and E.
coli was found to be 11 to 1, demonstrating the probable
predilection of carbapenemases for K. pneumoniae [2].
In this guidance document, for the purposes of har-
monisation with other guidance documents and reports
in the literature, CRE and CPE will both be referred to
as CRE, despite the fact that some CPE may not meet
the criteria for resistance to some of the carbapenems,
according to present breakpoints from The European
Committee on Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing
(EUCAST) [15]. Where necessary to specify, however,
CPE will be used.
Carriage of CRE
Patients who are carriers of, or have clinical infections
with CRE can act as reservoirs for transmission to other
patients, resulting in carriage, infection or outbreaks.
The terms “rectal” and “faecal” “carriage” are used in the
literature, interchangeably with “colonisation”. In this
document “carriage” will be used as an umbrella term to
include “colonisation” and “clinical infection”, since car-
riers are prone to develop clinical infection [16].
Table 1 Examples of the most frequently encountered
carbapenemases [67]
Acronym Name or type First isolated
KPC Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase 1996
VIM Verona integron-encoded metallo-β-lactamase 1997
OXA-48 OXA-type carbapenemase 2001
NDM New Delhi metallo-β-lactamase 2008
Table 2 Examples of select risk factors for carriage of CRE
Patient transfer between healthcare
settings within the same country
[45, 68]
Patient transfer between
healthcare settings across borders
[20, 21]
Prior admission to an acute care facility [20, 43, 69]
Prior admission to a LTCF [34, 45, 69, 70]
Household transmission from
patients discharged from healthcare settings
[47]
Foreign travel (e.g. recreational and
medical tourism)
[19, 21, 48, 71]
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Reliable data regarding the prevalence of CRE carriage
from the community and risk populations are not avail-
able, and those that are reported most likely represent
an underestimation of the true prevalence. This is due to
many factors, including but not limited to, differences in
the populations and healthcare settings in the studies, as
well as the methodology used for screening and report-
ing. More specifically most of these data come mainly
from non-systematic reporting of faecal carriage from
active patient screening in various epidemiological set-
tings, e.g. on admission, during outbreaks, during stays
at healthcare settings, after discharge from an acute care
facility or a LTCF, screening healthy people in the com-
munity and pre- and post- foreign travel (Table 2). This
renders the data difficult to compare and use in order to
create a reliable portrait of CRE carriage.
Until now, data from surveillance networks such as
EARS-Net in Europe, along with surveillance data from
other areas of the world, plus country reports of out-
breaks, permitted us to categorise countries as either
“low” or “high” incidence. The resistance landscape has
now changed and it has become difficult to be sure of
the exact epidemiology of hospitals and countries since
it is ever-changing and surveillance studies likely under-
detect and report true numbers. This is evident from
surveys like EuSCAPE [1, 14] which revealed that coun-
tries that were thought to be “low-incidence” may have a
higher burden than what was assumed [1]. Even a “low-
incidence” country can report CRE, either from
imported cases, or even autochthonous cases, leading to
hospital outbreaks and even inter-hospital and regional
spread [17, 18].
Travel to areas with high prevalence of CRE is also a
risk factor for carriage, as is shown in before-and-after
travel studies [19]. Undetected carriers present a real
challenge and an undetected reservoir for transmission
of CRE, because their carrier status is not known and
IPC measures are not implemented.
Globally, there has been an increase in the movement
of peoples and populations across country borders for
reasons which include, tourism (also medical tourism),
migration, medical repatriation, and the receipt of
healthcare. Patients who are transferred between health-
care settings across borders, or admitted to a healthcare
setting while they are abroad, may have become carriers
of CRE and can be considered a reservoir of these bac-
teria, introducing them into other healthcare systems
[20, 21]. This risk becomes relevant for any movement
of patients, and anyone who enters a healthcare system
from across borders anywhere in the world. In the EU,
the European Parliament and Council have published
Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients’
rights in cross-border healthcare [22], essentially facili-
tating the movement of peoples for the receipt of
healthcare. Increased awareness of the risk of carriage of
CRE across borders is needed.
Objective
The purpose of this guidance is to raise awareness of the
need to identify the “at-risk” patients who may be a car-
rier of CRE when they are admitted to a healthcare set-
ting. Furthermore, it will provide practical tools for
frontline healthcare workers to evaluate for and screen
“at-risk” patients and implement effective IPC measures,
when necessary. This document offers suggestions for
best practices, but is in no way prescriptive for all
healthcare settings or countries. It can be adopted or
adapted to local needs, depending on the availability of
financial and structural resources.
Methods
A systematic review
A systematic literature review was rigorously performed
and published by ECDC, to identify the best available
evidence on the effective infection prevention and con-
trol measures to prevent the transmission of CPE into
healthcare settings [23]. The initial population included
in the systematic literature search was set to patients
who were transferred across borders. This population
was subsequently broadened to also include patients ad-
mitted to, or transferred between any type of healthcare
setting.
To inform this guidance the 2011 ECDC systematic
review on the prevention of CPE was updated [20].
Search strategies were not restricted by study design,
language or publication status and the analyses were
limited to those studies which reported sufficient infor-
mation to meet items 9 and 17 (intervention description
and outcome assessment, respectively) of the ORION
statement [24]. The literature search for the systematic
review was finalised in July 2013. The Downs and Black
criteria [25] were used for quality assessment of observa-
tional studies. For comparative (i.e. had two study arms
each with a different intervention), the Cochrane Collab-
oration criteria were used [26]. The effective infection
control measures derived from the included studies are
listed as conclusions of the systematic review (please see
Appendix A) [23].
Expert meetings
After performing the systematic review, ECDC hosted
two meetings of external experts who were functioning
independently of their organisations, who evaluated the
methodology of the review, provided input on missing
studies, and agreed on the level of evidence, suggestions,
and guidance structure.
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Questions addressed in the guidance
The expert group agreed to structure the guidance in
order to address three main questions, listed below:
1. Which patient groups are considered “at-risk” for
carriage of CRE upon admission to a healthcare
setting? (Table 3)
2. What are the core IPC measures that should be
implemented for all patients in a healthcare setting,
regardless of their carrier status for CRE? (Table 4)
3. What are the supplemental, targeted measures that
should be implemented, when “at-risk” patients are
admitted to healthcare settings, in order to prevent
entry and spread of CRE? (Tables 5 and 6)
Creating the tables and a flowchart
At the expert meeting, the conclusions of the systematic
review for CPE were included in this guidance as effect-
ive measures for the prevention of entry and spread of
CRE into healthcare settings.
From the list of effective measures, the expert group
selected relevant measures and populated three other
lists containing “bundles” of measures; one bundle for
“core measures” (Table 4) and two for “supplemental
measures” (Tables 5 and 6). Additional measures consid-
ered effective by the expert group were added to these
lists as expert opinion. Separating the measures into
core and supplemental “bundles” of measures was pos-
sible because in the primary studies each measure had
been implemented only as part of a bundle and the mag-
nitude of effect of individual measures could not be
measured. Selecting the appropriate measures from the
original list and placing them in lists containing core
and supplemental measures was performed based on
measures that were already accepted internationally as
“standard precautions” [9], “contact precautions” [9],
and “additional precautions” [27], respectively. The
source of each measure included in Tables 4, 5 and 6 is
designated either as “systematic review” (SR) or “expert
opinion” (EO).
This guidance includes six tables (Tables 1, 2, 3, 4,
5 and 6) and a flowchart (Fig. 1). Tables 3, 4, 5, and
6 contain answers to the three main questions posed
in this guidance. The flowchart is a tool to assist
frontline workers and IPC teams in their evaluation
and decision-making when admitting patients to
healthcare settings.
Screening, detection, and management of
patients “at-risk” for CRE carriage
Identifying “at-risk” carriers of CRE by evaluating
whether they fall into any one of the four risk categories
outlined in Table 3, should be performed on admission
to the healthcare setting by the frontline healthcare
worker admitting the patient. Core measures (see Table
4), which include standard precautions, should be ap-
plied to all patients admitted to a healthcare setting, re-
gardless of known or suspected CRE carrier status.
The following preliminary supplemental measures
found in Table 5, should be implemented for all patients
who are “at-risk” for carriage of CRE:
a) Pre-emptively isolated in a single room;
b) Active screening for CRE by obtaining swabs from
rectal or perirectal areas, and any other site that is
either actively infected or considered to be colonised
c) Contact precautions implemented and used by
anyone entering the room
The following scenarios need to be considered,
depending on the results of active screening:
 If the screening test result is positive for CRE,
patient isolation and contact precautions are
continued, with the addition of supplemental
measures in Table 6.
 If the screening test result is negative for CRE,
consideration may be given to discontinuing patient
isolation and contact precautions, unless there is an
indication for their continuation, e.g. colonisation
with a different multidrug-resistant organism
(MDRO) or transmissible infection. Core measures
are maintained for all patients at all times.
 If a patient has a history of CRE carriage,
followed by a negative screening test result, the
decision on discontinuation of patient isolation
and contact precautions remains an open issue.
The decision should then be based on a case-by-
case risk assessment undertaken by a senior deci-
sion maker, in conjunction with advice of the IPC
team. Two main concerns contribute to this
uncertainty:
a. The possibility of having a false negative result.
False negatives can occur due to the lack of
standardised protocols for sampling and
microbiological testing, as well as issues, such as
sampling errors and prior use of antimicrobials,
amongst others. A varied approach can be seen in
studies that examine duration of carriage and
microbiological cultures and PCR are used alone,
or in various combinations, as well as with
different lengths of time between testing, e.g. two
or three negative screening cultures taken a week
apart [27–32].
b. Even after documenting clearance of carriage,
recurrences have been reported either by failure
of initial clearance, or by re-acquisition, making it
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even more difficult to know whether a patient is
no longer a carrier [28, 31].
 The duration of CRE carriage is unknown and
multi-factorial. The possibility of false negative test
results warrants consideration, as part of the deci-
sion to discontinue supplementary precautions.
Microbiological methods for the detection of CRE
Optimal samples to actively screen for CRE include, speci-
mens of faecal material, as well as active infection sites,
e.g. draining wounds, as well as other sites that may be
considered colonised, to be defined on a case-by-case
basis (e.g., areas of skin breakdown and endotracheal tube
aspirates or sputum if the respiratory tract is considered a
reservoir). Since faecal specimens are logistically more
challenging to obtain, rectal and perirectal swabs are taken
instead and have been shown to correlate well with the
sensitivity of faecal specimens [33].
To date, there is no consensus on the optimal microbio-
logical methods for detection of carriage of CRE and pro-
viding recommendations on microbiological methods is
beyond the scope of this document. A sensitive method
which provides results in a timely manner is advisable, to
facilitate prompt implementation of IPC measures.
Epidemiological exposures that place patients
“at-risk”
Patients may have had epidemiological exposures to sit-
uations and environments that can place them “at-risk”
for CRE carriage (Table 3). Obtaining a careful medical
and travel history is required.
Relevant questions during the medical interview
should include the following:
a. Has the patient had an overnight stay in a
healthcare setting in the last 12 months?
b. Has the patient been either dialysis-dependent or re-
ceived cancer chemotherapy in the last 12 months?
c. Does the patient have a known history of previous
carriage of CRE in the last 12 months? If the patient
has a known history of carriage of CRE in the last
12 months, their CRE carrier status should be
documented and communicated when they are
transferred from one healthcare setting to another.
In addition, patients themselves should be informed of
their CRE carrier status and they and their relatives or
carers, should be empowered to communicate this
information on presentation to healthcare settings.
d. Has the patient been previously epidemiologically
linked to a known CRE carrier?
A history of admission to a healthcare setting in the last
12 months
Healthcare facilities in areas with high incidence or out-
breaks of CRE are reservoirs of CRE [34, 35] (Tables 2 and
3, and flowchart in Fig. 1). Patients with a history of an
overnight stay in a healthcare setting in the last 12 months
and patients who are re-admitted, or transferred between
healthcare settings, are by definition “at-risk” and should
be screened for CRE on admission.
If a patient has had contact with a healthcare setting
abroad, defined as “outside the boundaries of any country”
in the last 12 months, it may be helpful when evaluating
the patient’s risk, to refer to the latest epidemiological data
on CRE from surveillance studies for that country. How-
ever, careful evaluation and decision-making is required
when either few or no data are available, or are not recent
since the epidemiological situation in a country or health-
care setting can change quickly [1]. In these cases it may
be prudent to categorise the patient as “at-risk” by default,
pending active screening results (Fig. 1). Furthermore, the
physician’s decision about whether the patient will be
treated as an “at-risk” patient, may be based on other fac-
tors specific to the healthcare setting such as, availability
of adequate staffing, structural or financial resources. Due
to limitations in surveillance and the slow spread of CRE,
even in countries with very low prevalence, it is still
strongly suggested to evaluate the risks of each individual
patient on admission; the decision whether to screen is ul-
timately up to the admitting physician. The admission of
even one patient who is a carrier, but is undetected, can
result in spread of CRE.
Patients who have been either dialysis-dependent or
received cancer chemotherapy in the last 12 months
Certain procedures performed in the ambulatory setting
can place a patient “at-risk” for carriage of CRE because
of the use of contaminated devices, the presence of
Table 3 Exposures that place patients “at-risk” patients for carriage of CRE
Any patient who has one of following risk factors is “at-risk” for carriage of CRE:
a. A history of an overnight stay in a healthcare setting in the last 12 months
b. Has been either dialysis-dependent or received cancer chemotherapy in the last 12 months
c. Known history of previous carriage of CRE in the last 12 monthsa
d. Has been previously epidemiologically linked to a patient known to be a carrier of CREb
a Microbiological information is obtained from the patient or is documented in patient’s medical records. If duration from previous microbiological confirmation is
longer than 12 months, the decision regarding the risk lies with the admitting physician
b e.g. healthcare or household contacts of patients with known history of carriage of CRE
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Fig. 1 Flowchart for assessment of carriage of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae in patients being admitted to healthcare settings.
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long-term intravenous catheters, overuse of antimicro-
bials, immunosuppression and breaches in IPC during
the procedure and other activities surrounding them.
Two categories of patients should be considered as “at-
risk”: those who have been haemodialysis- or peritoneal
dialysis-dependent in the last 12 months [36–39] and
cancer (haematology and solid-tumour) patients with
long-term intravenous catheters who have received can-
cer chemotherapy in an outpatient setting in the last
12 months (see Table 3) [40].
Another invasive procedure in the ambulatory setting
that one may need to consider on a case-to-case basis,
is endoscopic retrograde pancreatography (ERCP),
which has been implicated in transmitting CRE by con-
taminated devices that were not correctly re-processed
[41, 42]. For the latter, and any other type of invasive
procedure in the ambulatory setting, the level of risk
for carriage of CRE attributed to patients who report an
invasive procedure in an ambulatory setting in last
12 months will depend on factors that have to do with
knowledge of local factors. These include the CRE epi-
demiology and the level of implementation of IPC mea-
sures and healthcare infrastructure in the place where
the invasive procedure was performed.
Previous carriage of, or infection with a CRE in the last
12 months
Known CRE carriers should be carefully evaluated. Per-
sistent carriers can be a source of transmission if
supplementary measures, including contact precau-
tions, isolation or cohorting, are not applied on re-
admission. While it is important to determine their
current carrier status, the natural history and duration
of carriage of CRE is unknown. Of the few available
studies of duration of carriage, most have included
high-risk populations (e.g. discharges from, or readmis-
sions to, acute care facilities and LTCFs, and returning
travellers) [28, 29, 35, 43, 44]. The duration of carriage
varied in all studies underscoring the many factors that
influence it and the many types and combinations of
microbiological and molecular methods used to determine
carriage and clearance. In one study of CRE clearance in
patients post-acute care discharge, the median time to cul-
ture negativity was 387 days and 39% of patients were still
carriers at 12 months [29].
The situation is similar for residents of LTCFs, a
population that is at increased risk for persistent car-
riage for many reasons which include, frequent admis-
sions and re-admissions to acute care facilities,
residents’ many co-morbidities, a high prevalence of
antimicrobial use and frequent dependency on nursing
care in LTCFs. Furthermore, adherence of LTCF staff to
isolation and other IPC measures may be more difficult,
because implementation of these measures can disrupt
the daily activities of the residents, affecting their psy-
chosocial functioning. Therefore, LTCF residents can
be a reservoir of CRE within all types of healthcare
settings [44, 45].
Instructions for use of flowchart in Figure 1 for the management of “at-risk” patients being admitted to healthcare settings
This guidance document was created as a practical tool, for use by frontline HCWs and IPC and control professionals, for the evaluation and
management of patients admitted to a healthcare setting. The goal is to identify the “at-risk” patients carrying CRE and to implement measures
to prevent the transmission of these bacteria to other patients in the healthcare setting.
On admission to the healthcare setting, frontline HCWs should evaluate all patients to see whether they fall into any one of the four risk
categories outlined in Table 3 and the flowchart in Fig. 1, and whether they have prior microbiological evidence for CRE carriage. See flowchart
on how to manage patients who are potential carriers.
All admitted patients should have core measures applied regardless of their carrier status. These should be continued for the duration of their stay.
Any patient who is a potential carrier should have the following three preliminary supplemental measures implemented:
a) pre-emptive isolation in a single room while waiting for results of screening
b) active screening for CRE by obtaining swabs from rectal or perirectal areas and any other site that is either actively infected or considered to be colonised
c) contact precautions implemented and used by anyone entering the room.
If the result of the active screening is positive for CRE, the measures (patient isolation and contact precautions) are continued and additional
supplemental measures are added. Timely communication of the latest microbiological results with the clinical and IPC teams is critical, the patient’s
contacts should be screened for CRE carriage, enhanced environmental cleaning applied and consideration given to designated nurse cohorting,
based on the clinical situation and location.
If the results of active screening are negative for CRE and there is no other indication to continue contact precautions (e.g., patient colonised with
another MDRO or patient with a transmissible infection, such as C. difficile) contact precautions can be discontinued, but core measures should be
continued.
For the patient with a previous positive result for CRE, but from whom CRE is not detected on readmission screening, the decision to continue
supplemental measures should be based on a case-by-case risk assessment, in consultation with the IPC team. Factors to be taken into consideration
include: the clinical area to which the patient is admitted (e.g., critical care, transplant, oncology), patient age, underlying comorbidity, invasive device
use, skin breaks, incontinence, recent antimicrobial use, microbiological tests and schema used for assessing carriage, taking into account the possibility
of a false negative screening test result, and interval since the last positive culture for CRE, among others
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In one study [44], only 17% of residents who were car-
riers of Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase (KPC)-pro-
ducing Enterobacteriaceae had resolution of carriage
during a median four-week stay in a LTCFs and half of
those were still carriers when readmitted 9 months later.
The duration of CRE carriage is influenced by factors such
as immunosuppression, presence of indwelling devices,
prior stay in healthcare settings, transfer from or readmis-
sion to healthcare settings, poor functional status, high co-
morbidity index and exposure to antimicrobials [30, 43].
There are no standardised protocols for sampling and
microbiological testing to detect resolution of carriage.
Most studies use microbiological cultures or polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) alone or a combination of the two,
in various combinations and time intervals between
testing [28–31]. Furthermore, even after documenting
clearance of carriage, recurrences have been reported
[28, 31], either by failure of clearance, or by re-
acquisition, making it even more important to evaluate
each patient on a case-by-case basis. A length of follow
up or a duration of carriage of up to 12 months is com-
mon and is frequently used as a cut-off due to lack of
standardisation and consensus [29, 31].
In this guidance, a maximum duration of carriage for
“at-risk” patients post discharge will be 12 months. In
situations when the duration is longer than 12 months,
the admitting HCW, in consultation with the IPC team,
shall decide whether to consider a patient “at-risk”.
Epidemiologically linked to a patient known to be a
carrier of CRE
A known CRE carrier, with whom the patient has been
in contact either in a healthcare setting or in the house-
hold, should be regarded as a close contact. Although
there are limited data to define the time of exposure
needed to constitute a “close contact”, one Israeli case-
control study [46] reported an exposure to a newly diag-
nosed carbapenemase- producing CRE patient of ≥3 days,
as a risk factor for CRE carriage in a hospital setting.
Close household contacts of CRE carriers [47, 48]
can act as reservoirs for transmission. This risk factor
should be taken into consideration when household
contacts of these patients are admitted to healthcare
settings. However, the decision to actively screen house-
hold contacts of known CRE carriers will depend on case-
by-case risk assessment and local protocols.
Areas of uncertainty for active screening of
specific populations
Should healthcare workers be screened for CRE upon
admission to a healthcare setting?
Active screening of HCWs, when admitted as patients,
based on their occupation is not currently recommended.
Published prevalence estimates of HCW rectal carriage of
CRE rectal carriage vary, depending on the country as well
as healthcare and epidemiologic setting [49, 50]. It is most
probable, however, that even if a HCW were found to be
rectally colonised with CRE, the correct application of
standard precautions, and in particular hand hygiene,
would most likely disrupt the pathway of transmission of
CRE from their hands to patients. When a HCW is admit-
ted as a patient to a healthcare setting, they should, how-
ever, be assessed in the same way as any other patient (see
Table 3). Further studies are necessary to fully understand
the potential reservoir and risk as well as transmission
dynamics.
Should all returning travellers from abroad be screened
for CRE upon admission to a healthcare setting?
Foreign travel has been shown to be a risk factor for the
carriage of CRE even in previously healthy people [19,
48]. If a patient has a history of foreign travel, the deci-
sion of whether or not to screen for CRE carriage, will
lie with the admitting physician in consultation with the
IPC team. Factors to consider during the evaluation in-
clude; epidemiology of the region where patient travelled
and patient-specific factors such as, co-morbidities, im-
munosuppression, diarrhoea during travel and exposure
to healthcare settings while abroad.
Core infection prevention and control measures
for all patients
These are considered the basic level of IPC measures [9,
51], and should be applied for all patients for the dur-
ation of their stay in a healthcare setting. Three of the
measures listed in Table 4 have been further selected
and are discussed below. These were selected because of
the need to increase awareness for strict compliance
(e.g. hand hygiene) and to support the creation of certain
structures and indicators in healthcare settings (e.g. anti-
microbial stewardship and microbiological capacity).
Antimicrobial stewardship
Antimicrobials are very commonly prescribed for treat-
ment in human medicine, but may be used unnecessarily
in up to 50% of cases [52]. It is important that the effect-
iveness of existing antimicrobials is preserved for the
treatment of infections with CRE. Furthermore, the
antimicrobial pipeline is running dry, with a deficit in
novel antimicrobial development to address the rise
in CRE [53].
A definition of antimicrobial stewardship is provided
in a recent article from the Transatlantic Taskforce on
Antimicrobial Resistance (TATFAR) Expert Panel on
Stewardship Structure and Process Indicators [54]. Anti-
microbial stewardship programs are “coordinated
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programs that implement activities to ensure appropriate
antimicrobial prescribing”. In any healthcare setting,
antimicrobial stewardship should be implemented as
part of a multimodal and integrated approach, along
with the application of IPC measures and the invaluable
support of a microbiology laboratory that has the cap-
acity for timely and accurate detection of CRE [55].
Antimicrobial stewardship programmes should be
multidisciplinary, with a core team made up of an infec-
tious disease physician or clinical microbiologist, and a
clinical pharmacist with training in infectious diseases
[54]. In order to develop and implement a local anti-
microbial stewardship program, it is important that the
advice of specialists with expertise in diagnosis, manage-
ment and prevention of infection is available to all types
of healthcare settings including acute, primary and resi-
dential care.
Hand hygiene
Hand hygiene is a core element of standard precautions
and the cornerstone to prevent transmission of CRE. To
effectively promote hand hygiene, interventions need to
be multimodal and sustained over time. Indications and
proper technique for hand hygiene and the selection of
hand hygiene agents, should be in compliance with the
World Health Organization (WHO) recommendations
from the WHO guidelines [56].
The hands of HCWs may become contaminated dur-
ing direct patient care or after contact with the patient’s
environment. Hand hygiene has been shown to be the
single most effective measure to limit the cross-
transmission of MDROs and prevent HAIs [57]. A sys-
tematic review conducted by the WHO showed that
studies reporting a significant improvement in hand hy-
giene compliance and/or alcohol based hand rub con-
sumption, also reported a substantial decrease in rates of
infections with and/or carriage of MDROs [58]. Although
most included studies focused on the transmission of
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) as an
outcome, the conclusions may apply to CRE.
Microbiological capacity
Healthcare settings should have access to microbiology
laboratories with competence and capacity to detect
CRE in both clinical and screening samples. Results from
microbiological analyses should be communicated to the
clinical staff in a timely manner, and clinically or epide-
miologically significant findings should prompt immedi-
ate and direct contact with the clinical staff and IPC
team to ensure proper follow-up. Microbiological ana-
lyses should be performed in accordance with inter-
nationally recognized standards, i.e. EUCAST [59] or
The Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute (CLSI)
[60], including procedures for quality control. Specific
algorithms for microbiological screening and processing
of clinical samples may need to be adapted to local
epidemiology of antimicrobial resistance, therapeutic tra-
ditions, and IPC protocols. All microbiological laborator-
ies should be linked to reference laboratories and
participate in external quality assurance schemes for
antimicrobial resistance.
Supplemental measures for “at-risk” patients
In addition to the core measures listed in Table 4, pa-
tients who fall into any of the risk categories in Table 1
should have supplemental measures also applied. Ini-
tially, when patients are “possible carriers” the three pre-
liminary supplemental measures listed in Table 5, should
be applied. These are: a) pre-emptive isolation in a single
room b) active screening for CRE by obtaining swabs
from the rectal or perirectal areas, and any other site
that is either actively infected or considered to be colo-
nised and c) implementation of contact precautions for
use by all persons entering the room [27, 32, 61, 62].
Pre-emptive patient isolation and decisions on patient
placement
The evidence from this and other systematic reviews,
suggests that patient isolation in a single room should
be the goal to limit CRE transmission. Whenever pos-
sible, CRE carriers should be placed in a single room
with an en suite bathroom, in order to reduce the risk of
cross transmission [27, 32, 61, 62]. Infrastructural limita-
tions make this not always feasible, however. A limited
number of single rooms and even fewer en suite isola-
tion rooms, as well as limited financial and staffing re-
sources, e.g. fewer medical staff and IPC professionals,
are particularly challenging issues. Resources may be
stretched even more when facilities have high rates of
CRE. The first point prevalence survey of HAI and anti-
microbial use in acute care hospitals in the EU/EEA,
took place in 2011–2012, reporting a median proportion
of single room accommodation in Europe of 9.9% and
was less than 5% for eight countries [63].
Whenever a single room is not available, the patient
placement decision should be made after an individua-
lised risk assessment performed in consultation with the
IPC team. When single rooms are unavailable, cohorting
patients who are positive for the same MDROs in the
same multi-bedded room is recommended. Prioritisation
of bacteria of particular concern, e.g. extensively-drug
resistant (XDR) bacteria [64] should also be considered
and cohorting of affected patients initiated. Additional
attention to cleaning measures and waste management
is needed [65]. Whenever possible, nurse cohorting
should also be implemented, i.e., designation of nursing
staff to care only for the MDRO positive patients during
the same shift.
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When the option of single room isolation and
patient cohorting is available, the decision on place-
ment should be based on an individualised risk as-
sessment. Factors to take into consideration include:
the resistance profile of the specific CRE (e.g. the
more resistant phenotype takes precedence for single
room isolation), known co-colonisation with a differ-
ent MDRO (e.g., MRSA, VRE) or a transmissible in-
fection (e.g., C. difficile) takes precedence for single
room isolation and patient factors that pose a higher
risk of transmission (e.g., draining wounds, uncon-
trolled secretions, diarrhoea, incontinence, indwelling
medical devices or behavioural issues) [9].
When neither patient isolation in a single room nor
cohorting with others carrying the same CRE is feas-
ible, the decision regarding which patients should be
put in the same room should again be individualised.
Patients with a lower cross-transmission risk may be
considered for cohorting (e.g. projected short stay,
self-caring, absence of indwelling devices, open or
draining wounds and diarrhoea and patients who are
continent) [9].
Contact precautions
For all interactions with the CRE positive patient or resi-
dent, contact precautions should be used, in addition to
standard precautions [27, 32, 61, 62]. Pre-emptive con-
tact precautions should be implemented for those pa-
tients with possible or probable carriage of CRE while
awaiting confirmation of the latest status (Fig. 1) in con-
sultation with the IPC team. Periodic audits of compli-
ance with these IPC measures have been linked to
favourable outcomes [32].
Nurse cohorting
Nurse cohorting or designating nursing staff to the care
of patients who are positive for MDROs only during
their shift, was not studied as a single IPC measure, but
was found to be effective in controlling the spread of
CRE when implemented as part of a bundle of measures
[23, 32]. One can, therefore, expand this term, to in-
clude cohorting of other staff groups as well, e.g., doc-
tors and other HCWs, and also use various models to
accomplish this, e.g. total cohorting of nursing care or
partial daily shift cohorting of medical staff. However, it
Table 4 Core infection prevention and control measures to minimize risk of spread of CRE within and between healthcare settings
Intervention (Evidence source) Comments on measure and implementation
Antimicrobial stewardship (SR) ✓ Healthcare settings should have a formally defined antimicrobial stewardship programme for assuring
appropriate antimicrobial use [54]
✓ Healthcare settings should have facility-specific treatment (and prophylaxis) recommendations, based on
national guidelines and local microbial susceptibility, to assist with empiric antimicrobial selection [54]
✓ Should be part of a multimodal, integrated programme, along with IPC
Environmental cleaning (SR) ✓ Responsibilities for environmental cleaning and equipment reprocessing must be well-defined and
described in hospital internal procedures
✓ Hospitals should review the processes for environmental cleaning and equipment reprocessing, follow
instructions of manufacturers, and consider screening (or auditing) to ensure quality of processes
Equipment reprocessing (SR)
Faecal and medical waste management
(EO)
✓ Adequate toilet facilities should be available for all patients
✓ When patients are incontinent or have diarrhoea, bedpans or commodes may be indicated
Guidelines and processes (EO) ✓ Adherence to evidence-based guidelines, processes and pathways for the prevention of healthcare-
associated infections (EO)
Hand hygiene (SR) ✓ There is evidence for the effectiveness of hand hygiene, as part of a multimodal strategy, for the
reduction of transmission of MDROs [56–58]
✓ Patients should be encouraged to perform hand hygiene, as suggested by WHO guidelines [58]
Infrastructure and capacity for patient
accommodation (EO)
✓ Healthcare managers should ensure that the ward occupancy does not exceed the capacity for which
it is designed [72]
✓ Healthcare managers should ensure that infection prevention and control building recommendations
are followed
Microbiological capacity (EO) ✓ Healthcare settings should have access to microbiology laboratories with capacity to detect CRE from
both clinical and screening specimens
✓ Healthcare settings should have systems in place to ensure that potentially significant results are
communicated by the microbiology laboratory in a timely manner to the relevant staff in the
healthcare setting
✓ Should be part of a multimodal, integrated programme, along with IPC and antimicrobial stewardship
Staff education (SR) ✓ On-going education and training should be provided to all staff with patient contact, with specific ref-
erence to CRE
Staffing (EO) ✓ Staffing, appropriate skill level and workload of frontline healthcare workers must be adapted to acuity
of care and the number of pool/agency nurses and physicians minimised [72]
Surveillance (EO) ✓ Routine surveillance of healthcare-associated infections
SR Systematic review, EO Expert opinion
(Please see Additional file 1: Supplementary Table S2 in the supplementary section, for a printable summary of these measures)
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may be logistically challenging to achieve continuing
compliance with staff cohorting in settings where staff-
ing levels are suboptimal at baseline, situations where
staffing levels may be reduced (e.g., at night and at
weekends) or if there is a low prevalence of CRE
patients on the ward.
Communication on patient/resident transfer within or
between healthcare settings
When patients have a positive microbiological result for
a CRE, either from active screening or clinical culture,
the microbiology laboratory should communicate posi-
tive results in a timely manner to the relevant staff and
the patient’s healthcare record should be updated with
the positive result. Where available, electronic alerts on
the facility patient administration IT system may also
prompt staff of a patient’s known MDRO status and the
need for appropriate placement and IPC precautions.
Known positive MDRO status should also be docu-
mented and communicated in a timely fashion when pa-
tients or residents are transferred between units within
the same healthcare setting.
Furthermore, when known CRE carriers are transferred
between healthcare settings, inter-facility communication is
important to facilitate immediate implementation of appro-
priate IPC measures, to inform patient placement and the in-
terpretation of local active screening results. Healthcare
providers should ensure that the receiving facility is informed
of a patient’s CRE carrier status, and that transfer documen-
tation also contains information about any relevant positive
microbiology results. It is suggested that the patient’s
CRE carriage status could be included as a separate
diagnosis. Information about recent local clusters or
ongoing outbreaks should also be communicated to
the receiving facility.
Since the prevalence of relevant determinants in the aver-
age human microbiome of different geographical/societal
populations is unknown, it should be assumed that inter-
facility patient transfer from any country may pose a risk.
Active screening of rectal or perirectal swabs taken on pa-
tient transfer is an effective CRE detection method. The
European Parliament and Council published Directive 2011/
24/EU on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border
healthcare [22], which will increase the awareness of the risk
of transferring MDROs, including CRE when patients seek
healthcare abroad. Developing a standardised pan-European
form could be created, which would contain positive micro-
biological data. This document would be transported by the
patient, placed in a visible position in the chart, or sent to
the receiving healthcare facility. Additional verbal communi-
cation prior to the transfer is encouraged.
Development of EU-wide CRE surveillance, with
strengthening of mandatory reporting could be used to
generate timely information about prevalence, incidence,
and outbreaks of CRE.
Rapid exchange of information at the EU level could
be facilitated via the Epidemic Intelligence Information
System (EPIS) or the Early Warning and Response Sys-
tem (EWRS).
Active surveillance and contact tracing when patients are
epidemiologically linked to others who are CRE carriers
There are situations when inpatient active surveillance
and contact tracing may be considered to determine
whether or not onward transmission has occurred.
a) Detection of CRE from an inpatient who was not
isolated or on contact precautions (e.g., detection
from a clinical specimen or screening specimen
taken on transfer from a ward to a high-risk area
where active screening is performed)
b) In the event that supplemental precautions had been
implemented, but there is evidence of suboptimal
staff compliance with recommended precautions
c) Active surveillance and contact tracing is suggested
in the event of a cluster or outbreak of CRE, with
identification potential epidemiological links or
invasive procedures [42].
In healthcare settings with low CRE prevalence, the num-
ber of contacts to be screened for CRE is determined on a
case-by-case basis, taking into account proximity to the
index case, duration of exposure, and whether there was
shared nursing staff. In “at-risk” units, (e.g. intensive care,
transplant surgery, haematology oncology wards) the entire
unit may need to be screened for CRE [66]. If additional
CRE carriers are identified, the circle of screening will need
to be expanded, taking into account the contacts of the
newly detected carriers.
Key messages and conclusions
The global increase in infections with CRE is cause for con-
cern, because these highly resistant bacteria are associated
with higher patient morbidity, attributable mortality, and
few or no antimicrobials remain effective for treatment.
Acute care facilities and long-term care facilities can be res-
ervoirs of CRE and patients who spend time in healthcare
settings, have had an invasive procedure in ambulatory
care, have had close contact with someone who is a CRE
carrier, are at risk for becoming carriers. Carriers can then
act as reservoirs for spread of these bacteria when admitted
to or transferred between healthcare settings.
When admitted to a healthcare setting, core IPC mea-
sures should be implemented for all patients and main-
tained for the duration of their stay. They are the most
basic level of IPC precautions and HCWs should strictly
adhere to these to prevent spread of CRE.
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In addition to the core measures, patients who fall into
any of the risk categories should have supplemental IPC
measures applied. Initially, when patients meet the ex-
posure criteria, they are “possible carriers” and three
preliminary supplemental measures should be applied: a)
pre-emptive isolation of the patient in a single room b)
active screening for CRE by obtaining swabs from rectal
or perirectal areas, and any other site that is either ac-
tively infected or considered to be colonised, and c) im-
plementation of contact precautions for use by all
persons entering the room.
Countries and healthcare settings should ensure that
they have both the microbiological capacity and sensitive
and timely methodology to detect carriage of CRE.
Whenever possible, CRE carriers should be accommo-
dated in isolation rooms with en suite bathroom facilities.
In the face of increasing antimicrobial resistance, local and
national strategies are required to modernise healthcare
infrastructure to meet the challenges of MDROs.
The availability of an adequate number of appropriately
trained IPC healthcare professionals for acute and long-
term care healthcare settings, along with appropriate
training for all HCWs for the correct implementation of
IPC measures, including the core and supplementary
measures outlined in this document, is of paramount
importance.
When patients have a positive microbiological result,
from either active screening or a clinical culture, the micro-
biology laboratory should communicate positive results in a
timely manner to the relevant staff, the patient’s record
should be visibly flagged with the positive result, and the
positive data should be communicated in a timely fashion
when patients are transferred between units.
Furthermore, when CRE carriers are transferred be-
tween healthcare settings, healthcare providers should
communicate the patient’s status to the receiving facility
and transfer documentation should contain information
about the positive result. The responsibility for this com-
munication lies with the person sending the patient.
Information about recent clusters or outbreaks should
also be communicated to the receiving facility.
A larger, effective communication network within
countries in the European Union is necessary, so that
mandatory reporting of new cases of CRE can be shared
with all relevant parties. EU-wide surveillance with
strengthening of mandatory reporting can be an option
to facilitate the monitoring of these resistant bacteria.
This guidance is not prescriptive for all healthcare set-
tings and countries. Successful implementation of this
guidance can only happen if there is local commitment
and accountability of this guidance adapted to local needs,
taking into account available resources. Furthermore, the
dissemination of this guidance among EU/EEA countries
will help raise awareness among countries, healthcare
authorities and healthcare workers, about the need to
identify CRE carriers upon hospital admission. The
way this guidance will be used and how the conclu-
sions will be extrapolated to apply to other MDROs
will be up to the decision and policy of the local
healthcare settings.
Appendix A. Conclusions of ECDC systematic
review on effective infection prevention and
control measures for CPE [23]
 In agreement with the 2011 ECDC risk assessment,
there is no evidence on infection control measures
to specifically prevent the transmission of CRE
during cross-border transfer. Two studies included
in the updated 2013 review did include patients
transferred between hospitals in the same region.
From these studies, there is evidence that infection
control measures were effective in reducing
imported CRE.
 The findings from the updated 2013 review agree
with and extend the findings from the 2011 ECDC
risk assessment, in that the evidence for the
effectiveness of infection control measures comes
Table 5 Preliminary supplemental infection prevention and control measures for CRE “at-risk” patients with or without known
microbiological results
Intervention (Evidence source) Comments on measure and implementation
Pre-emptive isolation of patients on
admission (SR)
✓ Isolation in single rooms either upon admission or when patients are actively screened for carriage of CRE
✓ Decision for patient placement should be made after individualised risk assessment by, and consultation
with the IPC team
✓ En suite or bathrooms designated for use by known carriers, or commodes are strongly suggested for all
patients on contact precautions for CRE
Active screening on admission (SR)a ✓ Active screening of all “at-risk” patients on admission to healthcare setting
Contact precautions (SR) ✓ Contact precautions should be used for direct contact with patient or their environment
✓ En suite or bathrooms designated for use by known carriers, or commodes are strongly suggested for all
patients on contact precautions for CRE
SR Systematic review, EO Expert opinion
aActive screening encompasses rectal screening, as well as screening from any other site which is either actively infected, e.g. draining wounds, or considered to
be colonised
(Please see Additional file 1: Supplementary Table S3 in the supplementary section, for a printable summary of these measures)
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only from observational studies reporting infection
control measures in bundles (evidence level ++).
This evidence is limited by the lack of data from
controlled studies reporting single infection control
measures.
 As in the 2011 ECDC risk assessment, evidence
from outbreak reports in acute care settings was
identified in this 2013 updated review for the
effectiveness of the early implementation of active
surveillance by rectal screening for CRE carriage on
hospital admission, admission to specific wards/
units, and for surveillance during outbreaks
(evidence level ++).
 As in the 2011 ECDC risk assessment, evidence was
identified in this 2013 review for the effectiveness of:
a) pre-emptive isolation on admission, b) dedicated
nursing or other staff and c) contact precautions
(evidence level ++).
 In this review evidence was identified for the
effectiveness of the following infection control
Table 6 Supplemental infection control and prevention measures for patients with CRE preliminarily positive or confirmed
microbiological results
Intervention (Evidence source) Comments on measure and implementation
Contact precautions (SR) ✓ Contact precautions should be continued when patient is suspected positive or confirmed positive
✓ Contact precautions should be used for direct contact with patient or their immediate
surroundings and/or surfaces
✓ En suite or bathrooms designated for use by known carriers, or commodes are strongly
suggested for all patients on contact precautions for CRE
Patient isolation or patient cohorting (SR) ✓ When patients were previously pre-emptively isolated they should remain isolated if results of
active screening are suspected positive or confirmed positive
✓ If not already isolated, the patient should be isolated upon receipt of suspected or confirmed
positive microbiological result
Case communication (SR)
(Communication about microbiological results
within healthcare settings)
✓ Communication on patient/resident transfer within a healthcare setting
✓ Positive results should be communicated by the microbiology laboratory in a timely manner to
the relevant staff
✓ Healthcare record flagging and use of patient administration IT system flagging if feasible within
healthcare setting, regarding any positive microbiological information
✓ Consider including patient’s carriage or infection status for CRE as a separate diagnosis
✓ Positive microbiological data should be communicated in a timely fashion when patients are
transferred between units
Communication on patient/resident transfer between healthcare settings
✓ Transfer documentation must accompany patient/resident, with information about known
carriage or infection status
✓ Consider including patient’s carriage for CRE as a separate diagnosis
✓ Positive microbiological data should be communicated in a timely fashion when patients are
transferred between healthcare settings within regions, country and across borders
✓ The responsibility to notify the receiving healthcare setting of patient’s/resident’s relevant
microbiological data rests with the referral healthcare setting
✓ Ensure communication by a responsible person of local current or recent clusters or outbreaks
to the receiving institution when patients/residents are transferred
Communication on patient transfer between healthcare settings in different countries
✓ Transfer documentation must accompany patient, with information about patient’s carriage or
infection status
✓ Consider including patient’s carriage or infection status for CRE as a separate diagnosis
✓ Recognise the importance of implementing the cross-border Directivea in preventing inter-
country spread of CRE
✓ Ensure timely communication with receiving healthcare setting for all positive patient
microbiological data
✓ Ensure that patient’s rights for personal data protection are secured when sharing patient data
between healthcare settings1
Active screening of contacts (SR) ✓ Active screening of patients/residents who are epidemiologically linked to a known CRE carrier
Nurse cohorting (SR) ✓ While acknowledging existing limitations in staffing and other resources, cohorting or
designated nursing staff is strongly suggested for the care of patients with CRE
Enhanced environmental cleaning (EO) ✓ Enhanced cleaning should be performed, especially for areas in close proximity to CRE carriers
✓ Terminal disinfection of rooms should be performed upon transfer or discharge of patients
Bathing in antiseptic (SR) ✓ Data mostly available from Gram-positive organisms; can be used as a horizontal approach for
other MDROs [73]
✓ Due to lack of strong evidence, can be considered for use in difficult-to- control situations
SR Systematic review, EO Expert opinion
aDIRECTIVE 2011/24/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 9 March 2011 on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare [22]
(Please see Additional file 1: Supplementary Table S4 in the supplementary section, for a printable summary of these measures)
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measures: a) patient cohorting, b) hand hygiene,
c) patient isolation, d) nursing (or staff ) cohorting
(similar to dedicated nursing), e) environmental
cleaning, f ) staff education, g) case notification/
flagging, h) contact tracing and i) antimicrobial
restriction (evidence level ++).
 Evidence for the effectiveness of ward or intensive
care unit closure remains available from the original
2011 ECDC risk assessment. No new evidence for
these was identified in this 2013 updated review.
 Other infection control measures may also be
effective, but the evidence supporting their
effectiveness is less clear due to a lack of data.
 The best available evidence for the effectiveness of
interventions derived from this review and the 2011
ECDC risk assessment comes from data reported
from observational studies, which, for the most part
include interventions that are part of a bundle of
measures, making the effectiveness of each measure
less clear. It would be necessary to strive for better-
designed and reported studies that provide evidence
for the benefit and harm of infection control mea-
sures for the prevention and control of CRE.
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